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WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A 
REAPPRAISAL  
FRANK CARRIGAN 
The purpose of this article is to explore the economic logic of the market in 
relation to the gender composition of Australian boardrooms. It argues that 
the benefits that could flow from more women occupying senior positions in 
Australian corporations will not overcome the laws of the market and the 
inherent competitive pressures that determine the trajectory of corporations. 
Placing more women on corporate boards must be supported as a matter of 
equity. However, it is unlikely that such a democratisation of corporations 
will impact on the internal structures that foster the broader inequality that 
is the taproot of the system and constitutes the day to day relationships of 
business. 
I INTRODUCTION 
In an Australian law journal article, ‘Regulating for Women on Corporate 
Boards: Polycentric Governance in Australia’,1 Vijaya Nagarajan explores the 
case for advancing the role of women on boards. Her article focuses on 
pinpointing mechanisms that need to be more efficacious if gender diversity at 
the apex of the corporate form is to be optimised. In effect, she suggests ‘using 
diverse methods to change business norms to move slowly to our goal’.2 
In essence, Nagarajan undertakes an enquiry into regulatory instruments that 
have the potential capacity to increase the participation of women on corporate 
boards if only they were better implemented. Her objective is to list 
mechanisms that could assist in achieving a more egalitarian corporate gender 
order, and the regulatory forces that are best equipped to implement gender 
diversity at the top of the corporate tree. Nagarajan proceeds with caution but 
her exploration of the regulatory kit that has the capacity to ameliorate 
corporate democratic deficits operates in an environment where in her own 
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words there is a ‘widespread acknowledgment that the inadequate 
representation of women on corporate boards was a problem that should be 
addressed’.3  
This article has a different conceptual framework to the one utilised by 
Nagarajan. It places the spotlight on some of the key mechanisms that she 
explores and argues that, even if they were made more effective, the corporate 
gender issue would still confront contradictions. This work will act as a 
counterpoint to what Nagarajan terms ‘the regulatory game in Australia’.4 It 
will excavate the foundations of the corporate economy, and propose that 
boosting regulatory tools offers at best a partial way forward for dealing with 
the inadequate role of women in the corporate suites of Australia. At various 
points this work will develop a parallel conceptual structure of the modern 
corporation that goes beyond positing more women on corporate boards as the 
way forward for what Nagarajan describes as ‘moving the corporate board to a 
more democratic representation of societies’ diversity’.5 
The role of gender and the structure of corporate boards is not just an Australia-
based issue. It is, as Nagarajan’s article notes, a topic being pursued in a number 
of countries.6 Nagarajan’s focus on the gender gap at the corporate board level 
provides a welcome platform to interrogate the crucial issue of women in the 
boardroom. 
This article will espouse the view that the gender composition of corporate 
boards is secondary in a modern corporate capitalist economy to the quest to 
recruit those who possess the individual qualities required to maximise profits. 
Those at the commanding heights of the economy are driven, regardless of 
gender, to maximise their own skill set and optimise the business’s productivity 
by utilising the resources of the business with the greatest possible efficiency. 
In order to understand the deep-seated causes of events in a market economy it 
has to be remembered ‘that the characters who appear on the economic stage 
are merely personifications of economic relations; it is as the bearers of these 
economic relations that they come into contact with each other’.7 To maximise 
profit and to remain in business are the sole goals of capitalist enterprises and 
these aims are dependent on enterprises utilising factors of production in a way 
that will produce the most efficient level of output.8 In effect, the systemic logic 
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of the market laws of capitalism eclipses any factors other than talent in 
accumulating capital in determining those equipped to become company 
directors.  
The liberal utilitarian view of market society9 relies upon the assumption that 
the sovereign decisions of individuals operate in the context of an open market 
of freely contracting adults, which maximises an efficient allocation of 
resources. Under this model the process of individual rational calculation is 
gender neutral in the sense that the gender identity of the participants impacts 
not one jot on the optimum allocation of resources.10 The market is only 
explicable by reference to the goals and actions of rational utility-maximising 
individuals.11 Capitalist entrepreneurs function under the compulsion of a set of 
austere market principles oriented to maximising profit that operate in a manner 
indifferent to the gender of individuals.12 
The competitive accumulation process that is the keystone of capitalism 
dictates that each company must turn the screw on its workers and achieve 
output per worker equal to or higher than that of its competitors  and with no 
more waste, or end up in liquidation.13 It is the skill level of individuals of either 
gender that is the key to a company’s success, and particularly their ability to 
optimise productivity and drive down labour costs per unit of production that 
is the litmus test for the capacity to operate at the apex of a corporation. The 
primary dynamic of capitalism is the extraction of surplus value from wage 
labourers14 and, if a woman has the skills to maximise economic efficiency and 
becomes a business executive, her gender is secondary to the fact that she is, by 
virtue of her commercial role, a participant in economic relations based on 
power.  
Regardless of the business executive’s individual approach to social policy, she 
is an integral part of the dominant class and is therefore compelled to operate 
in accordance with the profitmaking logic of the capitalist system. Her 
privileged class location makes her a bourgeois woman, endowed with the 
social power to extract surplus value from the sweat of a worker. Female 
directors are on a different social plane to women employees who are paid a 
wage that is less than the value they generate during the course of a working 
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day.15 The stratospheric income of directors of either gender in the largest and 
most successful enterprises is accounted for by workers not receiving the full 
value of their labour.  
A critical spirit and the courage to boldly take a contrarian position on issues 
are prerequisites for life at the apex of the corporate pyramid. Boosting 
boardroom female numbers is a laudable aim and one that progressive thinkers 
must support. Nagarajan is right to state that ‘there is widespread acceptance 
that companies should have more women on their boards’.16 However, the full 
implications of achieving that goal must be considered. Whatever gender one 
belongs to is immaterial to life at the commanding heights of a corporation. In 
a nutshell, an executive is judged according to the sole yardstick of his or her 
ability to maximise earnings per share on behalf of investor. Only those 
administrators of capital who achieve an efficient allocation of economic 
resources and maximise returns in their industry will keep investors happy, and 
thus stay in the corporate limelight. Adding maximum value to corporate assets 
is the prime objective of those in the cockpit of a corporation, and the 
achievement of that goal depends on variables that have nothing to do with 
gender.  
The focal point of a corporation is to maximise the profits of the shareholders 
who own the capital, and boosting the participation of women at the level of 
the corporate board for any reason other than profitability runs counter to its 
purpose. Capital cares only about the colour of money, not the gender of the 
administrators of the system. As Bakan notes: ‘The corporation, like the 
psychopathic personality it resembles, is programmed to exploit others for 
profit. That is its only legitimate mandate.’17  
A crucial barrier to gender diversity is the structure of the corporation and the 
obstacles it places in the way of any type of social engineering. For example, 
Bakan argues that corporate social responsibility is illegal. As he puts it: 
‘managers and directors have a legal duty to put shareholders’ interests above 
all others and no legal authority to serve any other interest.’18 When the sole 
mandate of a corporation is to maximise profits any tinkering with its profit 
objective is shot through with contradictions. The reluctance of a number of 
powerful states to legislate for gender diversity despite ‘widespread 
acceptance’ of the notion pinpoints the role that capital imperatives play in the 
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modern corporation. Public pressure is diminishing the sway of capital and 
reducing the gender gap but it is a slow process.  
It may be the case that eventually the social justice argument for gender balance 
in boardrooms will everywhere override the profit imperative. But, given the 
legal duties of privileging shareholder interests imposed upon directors by 
corporate law, the whole issue of gender diversity is problematic. Hadden 
notes: ‘Company law is about capitalism. It provides the formal legal structure 
necessary to the operation of the capitalist system.’19 Corporate law is 
inextricably intertwined with the profit system. 
The measure of success in a market economy is nothing other than the capacity 
to effectively pursue maximum profit. The iron law of economic competition 
compels every firm to cut costs, and be price competitive and optimise profit, 
or fall by the wayside. The economic downside of putting gender diversity or, 
for example, the quest for corporate responsibility in the vanguard when 
making appointments to corporate boards needs to be examined. Equitable 
factors are extraneous to the running of a capitalist corporate economy.    
The first part of this article examines the backdrop to what Nagarajan terms 
‘tackling the gender gap on the boards of publicly listed companies’.20 
Nagarajan’s article is a reminder that pressure is building on the corporate front 
as progress towards gender diversity has been made in a number of countries. 
Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and France have ‘all introduced 
legislation requiring gender quotas’.21 The British government is contemplating 
imposing quotas to speed up the appointment of women directors.22 At the same 
time, in the United States, with the percentage of women on boards at 12.6 per 
cent, the voluntary approach to boosting numbers is being promoted.23 Change 
is slowly happening but some powerful capitalist societies are still resistant to 
expansive movement. 
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The article then undertakes an examination of some of the thinking underlying 
the push for board gender diversity before presenting a series of case studies 
that scrutinise the history of a number of female directors who scaled the 
corporate heights. In this part of the work it is suggested that for the bulk of 
female wage-workers domination and subordination would continue to be the 
staple of their lives regardless of the gender composition of the corporate 
boardroom. This point which forms part of this article’s framework of analysis 
of corporate power will, along with other factors, be reinforced in the course of 
the article.  
II EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW AGAIN 
In her article, Nagarajan notes that women hold 10.9 per cent of the 
directorships available in the leading 200 Australian publicly listed 
companies.24 She notes reasons that are advanced to redress the issue of the 
gender gap in the boardroom and describes them as being constitutive of:  
a more democratic representation of societies’ diversity; improved decision-
making by increasing the range of views, values and experiences represented; 
better corporate profitability; and finally an enhanced corporate image for 
shareholders, employees and consumers.25  
Nagarajan puts forward a methodology which is termed ‘polycentric 
governance’ as the means of rectifying the gender deficit at the peak of the 
corporation. This multifaceted approach to reform involves the state 
collaborating with a myriad of private bodies in order to secure their 
compliance with the objective of increasing the participation of women on 
corporate boards.26 Parties that are already engaged in a relationship with 
government to increase the representation of women on boards are identified 
by Nagarajan: they include Woolworths, Westpac, the Australian Institute of 
Company Directors, the Business Council of Australia and the Australian Stock 
Exchange.27 According to Nagarajan, ‘the notion of the state being at the centre 
of regulation has given way to a polycentred notion of governance where a 
range of actors are involved in different facets of the regulatory regime’.28  
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Nagarajan describes how power in corporate Australia is shared among a 
constellation of forces. In effect she describes a pluralist interpretation of 
power. Her polycentric vision of power sees power as diffused and it has been 
depicted as creating a context where no ‘single set of interests is dominant’.29 
Polycentric governance according to Nagarajan produces a situation where 
social policy ‘is not dominated by one specific body such as a government 
funded regulator. Rather than the government taking control to implement and 
enforce quotas, it is multiple non-state actors that are facilitating this’.30 In 
effect, the liberal notion of atomistic and independent centres of power driving 
governance practices in a market society is of prime importance. Nagarajan’s 
analysis of key ideas is, however, thinly drawn. The concept of polycentric 
governance, for example, is left underdeveloped. No link is drawn between the 
interaction of the corporate oligarchy and the state. Private organisations and 
state structures are not portrayed as a unified entity always working hand in 
hand in shaping policy, with the state as an overarching body responsible for 
assisting in reproducing the hegemonic role of capital. The issue of whether 
polycentric governance is a diffused power model, and thus pluralism by 
another name, escapes Nagarajan’s field of enquiry.  
Pluralist theory was in vogue in the 1960s and 1970s and was based on the 
suggestion that the epicentre of power in contemporary market societies is not 
to be found in any particular class but is divided between elite bodies such as 
business, the church, parliament, the army and so forth.31 The fact that 
economic power translates into the establishment of a ruling class that wields 
social and political power is beyond the pluralist interpretation of power.  
Whilst Nagarajan describes a range of discrete actors lobbying for gender 
equality in the boardroom, she renders invisible the fact that these groups are 
an interlocking body that utilises the state to promote the collective viewpoint 
of a particular class. Those calling for the reshaping of corporate boardrooms 
are an integrated group. The monopolistic business interests in banking and 
industry typified by the Woolworths and Westpacs of Australia that Nagarajan 
depicts32 as calling for gender reform at the apex of the corporation are linked 
to lobby groups such as the Business Council of Australia and the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors33 that are also engaged in efforts to increase the 
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participation of women in the boardroom. It would be implausible to construe 
the Australian Institute of Company Directors and the Business Council of 
Australia as competing interest groups. Although Nagarajan does not pursue 
that line, her pluralist model, by omitting the crucial point that corporations and 
their lobby groups combine to create an integrated ruling class, fails to shed 
more than a partial light on the nature of the forces aiming to recruit more 
women into the boardrooms of Australia.  
Kuhn and O’Lincoln have cogently depicted the contours of the ruling elite that 
combine wealth, ownership and power in corporate Australia.34 Overseas 
studies highlight a similar phenomenon to the one illuminated by thinkers such 
as Kuhn and O’Lincoln.35 In the US, there is a long history of business interest 
groups translating their economic power into political and social power and 
thereby utilising their position to skew legislation towards serving narrow 
economic interests.36 In Australia the way in which business interest groups 
order government policy to suit their needs was evident in the way climate 
change has been addressed. Guy Pearse was a Liberal party member, lobbyist 
and a Howard government advisor before he produced an informative book 
depicting how the government of which he was an inside member allowed its 
climate policy to be written by the biggest corporate polluters and the lobbyists 
they funded.37  
The pluralist model collapses under the weight of the existence of monopolies 
that utilise the state to protect the extant social system based on concentrated 
private ownership of capital.38 Monopolies, through a number of channels, are 
engaged in reproducing social and power relationships, and they perform this 
function in league with state organs. Any talk, under these conditions, about the 
state devolving regulatory doctrine to a farrago of atomistic agents is 
misleading. It is an unrealistic strategy when the reality is that the economic 
clout of big business is translated into social and political power and the state 
operates to reproduce its hegemony.  
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Nagarajan makes a reference to the state at a few places in her article. But she 
limits her discussion of the state to statements about its potential to steer 
business norms towards compliance with achieving better gender outcomes at 
the board level.39 Nagarajan’s atomistic approach to power leads her to be at 
best ambiguous about the interrelationship between the state and business. She 
states: ‘I am using polycentric governance here because regulation in this space 
is emanating from many centres, involving non-state and state actors who may 
be acting independently or in concert.’40 There is an absence in her article of a 
searching analysis of the nature and function of the state in a capitalist society.  
The pact between capital and the state is aimed at maintaining the economic 
order.41 As Kuhn notes: ‘The decisions of members of the capitalist class have 
huge effects, because the productive resources and hierarchies they control give 
them power.’42 Quite simply, the personnel of the state apparatuses owe their 
allegiance to the upper echelons of the business class and not to a diffused set 
of interests. A pluralist model is an abstraction that mystifies the concentrated 
nature of power in a society ruled by corporations where the sovereign principle 
is the ownership of private property.43 Speaking about ‘many regulatory 
centres’44 entails applying an eclectic set of selection criteria that distracts 
attention from the capitalist class and its key role along with the state 
organisations that it dominates in setting the agenda for dealing with the gender 
gap in business ranks. 
Policy on the gender composition of corporate boards is something that those 
at the pinnacle of the economy and their myriad agencies will guide. The lack 
of a concerted view on the desired level of women in the boardroom within 
corporate Australia highlights the fact that, at this moment in history, there is 
no common view within the ranks of the economic elite on prioritising this 
issue. There is no insuperable barrier stopping an adequate representation of 
women in the boardroom. The fact that various states are moving on the issue 
is evidence that equality at board level is capable of being achieved by 
capitalism. Meiksins Wood makes the point that ‘capitalist exploitation is not 
inextricably linked with extra-economic, juridical or political identities, 
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inequalities or differences’.45 In the final analysis all that matters to capital is 
unrestricted access to the wage labour that produces profit. As Marx put it, ‘the 
most fundamental right under the law of capital is the equal exploitation of 
labour power by all capitalists’.46  
Those members of the economic elite and their state allies leading the charge 
to bolster the ranks of female directors will eventually carry the day. This is 
because recruiting the best brains from any gender to fill the ranks of corporate 
directors follows the logic of capital. The economy is based on profit 
maximisation and it is flexible enough to overcome resistance to discarding 
types of oppression that impede money-making and capital accumulation.47 
Change in the leading personnel at the peak of capitalist enterprise has been one 
of the hallmarks of capitalist history.48 Thus more women corporate directors 
will be appointed and this will be viewed as part of the evolution of the system. 
The decisive issue is whether a profit system will operate any differently with 
women at the corporate helm.  
The elimination of gender inequalities in the corporate boardroom would at best 
produce a limited form of equality that would pose no threat to the centralisation 
of corporate power. The extraction of surplus value from wage labourers would 
continue even as the corporate inner circle was expanded by more female 
directors. The bulk of female wage-workers would continue toiling for a living 
wage regardless of the gender of corporate bosses. It may well be the case that 
a boost in female participation on corporate boards would enhance democracy, 
narrow the gender gap and foster a climate for a more inclusive corporate 
governance and higher profitability. These are arguments listed by Nagarajan.49 
But the boost in democracy would only benefit a small fraction of women who 
would join the capitalist class, and any higher profits would be channelled 
towards shareholders.  
What needs to be done is to look beyond the political surface and anatomise the 
economic and social substance of corporations within which polycentric 
governance operates when considering increasing the participation of women 
on boards.  
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Whether ameliorating the corporate gender gap to benefit bourgeois women 
would alter the dynamics of the corporation and the nature of society is of 
crucial importance. Female directors are members of the ruling class and, if 
their entry to the inner circle is to be expanded this may well end up providing 
ideological cover for a global system grappling with stratospheric inequalities. 
The success of the women who climb to the summit of the corporation will be 
utilised by the corporate media to deflect attention from the interaction of 
gender and class and the structural forces that generate ongoing inequality for 
the majority of women in the workforce. In the context of corporations, the 
issue of equal opportunity being used to drive change at the apex of the 
corporation is a thorny one that requires further examination.  
III THE VIEW BEYOND THE SURFACE 
This section of the article implicitly critiques pluralist or polycentric 
frameworks of analysis. It examines the functioning of coercive structures that 
are at the heart of the corporate economy, and the sombre and intractable reality 
that underpins the mechanisms of the capitalist mode of production.  
Equal opportunity in a capitalist society is a problematic issue. What can be lost 
sight of is that an equality ethos is already a cornerstone of a market society. 
Formal equality exists between the buyers and sellers of labour hours. Contract 
law ensures that the wage contract creates formal equals, and excludes 
distinctions of a juridical or political sort. Under capitalism there is an absence 
of bondage to a feudal lord. Liberal individuals are already sovereign over 
themselves, their interests and property. Equality on the juridical and political 
planes is at a level far higher than it was in past socioeconomic forms.50  
Yet the equality of opportunity assured in the juridical and political spheres of 
liberal societies is matched by significant economic inequalities and this is the 
empirical basis for speaking of formal equality. The burgeoning of female 
directors will not change the ownership structure of the modern corporation or 
its fundamental logic that has led to 85 individuals worldwide amassing as 
much wealth as the poorest half of the world.51 Formal equality is only a 
component part of the ensemble of social relations. Fundamentally, people in 
market economies personify economic relations and this phenomenon shapes 
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how they connect with each other.52 Legal forms obscure the deep social and 
economic content expressed by social relations of production. A labour 
contract, for example, expresses a bargain struck by two legal equals, but what 
this masks is that the selling of labour hours is the source of money-making and 
the accumulation of capital for corporate capital. Understanding the difference 
between the appearance of things and the essential relations of economic life is 
the key to understanding how boosting female participation at the board level 
will not produce a more democratic society or an enhanced corporate image.  
Liberalism is a contradictory philosophy because, while it celebrates the 
precepts of democracy and equality, it simultaneously extends the dominance 
of those with economic power.53 The hallmark of liberalism is its pervasive 
individualism but this doctrine shrivels in an age of towering corporations that 
produce oligarchs of capital and the concentration of economic power. The 
economic hegemony of corporations brings in its wake the social and political 
leadership of the ruling economic class. 
The wages system is at the epicentre of corporate life. From a juridical point of 
view, the wage contract is a reciprocal relationship that involves workers 
voluntarily selling their labour power. This is an exchange relation 
characterised by equality and freedom,54 yet, just below the surface, coercion 
operates. This coercion represents the underside of liberalism and the 
corporation. For beyond the parameters of the exercise of choice that contract 
law exalts, the worker relinquishes property rights over labour power, the 
direction of work and the product of labour.55  
The wages system establishes what Marx termed ‘the silent compulsion of 
economic relations and sets the seal on the domination of the capitalist over the 
worker’.56 It is the fundamental economic relationship in a market society and 
it creates the basis, as Adam Smith noted, for the exploitation of labour.57 Smith 
pointed out that profit is based on workers producing more in value than they 
are paid. This operates behind the façade of free contract and juridical equality. 
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It is the hidden abode of corporations, and every shareholder and director, 
regardless of gender, benefits from the alchemy that occurs when formal 
equality morphs into substantive inequality ―for they are privileged 
benefactors of economic relations. Shareholders and directors gain from the 
underlying magic of market relations — what Smith termed the ‘profit deducted 
from employees’.58 In the final analysis, corporations render freedom of 
contract an illusion.  
Once corporations sell commodities on the market, they realise sums of capital 
greater than the cost of the wage labour they have employed, and this is the 
basis of Smith’s profit thesis. An increase in female directors will fail to make 
an impact on the laws of the market that are based on the limitless drive for 
profits. The laws of the market operate irrespective of gender. 
Therefore, programs to achieve greater representation of women on corporate 
boards will strengthen the position of a few privileged women, but will have 
negligible impact beyond the apex of corporate pyramids. Male and female 
executives will share stellar remunerative packages, but the position of male 
and female wage labourers will not be improved. The existence of wage labour 
has a deleterious impact on issues such as equality, justice and fairness whilst 
disproportionately affecting women workers who congregate in low wage jobs. 
The economic oppression of the many will continue unabated as the corporate 
hierarchy is filled out with more women.  
A recent study in the UK found that three times more young women were stuck 
in low paid and low skilled jobs than was the case twenty years ago.59 There is 
a gulf that divides bourgeois and working class women and their different roles 
in the class structure. The class disparities in the modern corporation highlight 
the limits of capitalist democracy. Moreover, even those women who break 
through the glass ceiling by climbing the corporate ladder, can find that their 
tenure of high office is limited by inexorable forces that shape their fate. Just 
as male corporate chieftains will be forced to resign if profits slide, their female 
counterparts will be bound by the same rules of capital. The experiences of 
three women who have scaled the corporate heights and been the beneficiaries 
of economic largesse illuminate the precarious life of those at the apex of the 
corporate pyramid. It is a worthwhile sociological exercise to consider the sort 
of environment that awaits those female executives that would increasingly take 
their place on boards if schemes to improve regulatory mechanisms were more 
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effective. The studies that follow pinpoint the harsh reality of life at the top of 
the corporate ladder. 
A The Case of Sue Morphet, Pacific Brands 
In 2005, an Australian clothing company producing a range of iconic underwear 
and hosiery products (Pacific Brands) was engaged in a systematic endeavour 
to lift productivity, raise profits and cut costs. A journalist on a tour of the 
Pacific Brands’, Wentworthville factory in Sydney’s west noted that ‘it is clear 
they have tried to squeeze out every efficiency from the production process’.60 
Pacific Brands was utilising computer technology to quicken the pace of 
knitting and dyeing machines producing underwear, t-shirts and swimwear.61 
The motor force behind the attempt to lift the output per hour of every worker 
was clear to the Pacific Brands hierarchy. This was part and parcel of a 
campaign to achieve the ‘sort of cost control and efficiency that the company 
has had to refine to survive against the behemoth that is the Chinese 
manufacturing sector’.62 In brief, Pacific Brands was involved in a desperate 
struggle to match or eclipse Chinese productivity levels and failure to do so 
would ensure unpalatable options. 
The Pacific Brands head of manufacturing was blunt. If there was any 
slowdown in innovation, reduction of costs or slackening of the speed of 
production, the Pacific Brands local manufacturing base would close.63 The 
head of manufacturing was adamant ‘that the economics of manufacturing in 
Australia are constantly reassessed by the company as competition intensifies 
and Chinese manufacturing standards improve’.64 In January 2008, Sue 
Morphet was anointed the chief executive of Pacific Brands. Within a year she 
and the rest of the board had come to the conclusion that there was ‘no long-
term sustainable advantage from local manufacturing’, and that ‘efforts to make 
(its facilities) cost efficient (were) no longer relevant’.65 Their belief was that 
domestic manufacturing was uncompetitive; and that, as a result, production 
was to be outsourced to China, making 1850 Australian workers redundant.66 
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There had been a profit slump, and the cost saving from shifting production off 
shore and axing local manufacturing was estimated at A$150 million a year.67  
In the period prior to Pacific Brands announcing its restructure sacking its 
largely migrant female workforce, Morphet’s annual package rose from 
A$685 775 to A$1.86 million.68 This sum included incentive payments for 
axing jobs.69  
By 2011, the Pacific Brands share price was languishing as new problems 
surfaced. The launch of the Spanish multinational Zara chain in Australia 
impacted on Pacific Brands’ grip on the youth market and retailers such as Myer 
were circumventing Pacific Brands by going directly to Chinese manufacturers 
in order to get cheaper house-brand merchandise.70 In 2012, Morphet fell on 
her sword as the annual net loss skyrocketed to A$450.7 million and sales fell 
by 18 per cent.71 Morphet was blamed for choosing poor suppliers in China and 
not stemming the resultant drop in quality and sales of key brands such as 
Bonds and Holeproof.72  
B The Case of Cynthia Carroll, Anglo American 
In March 2007, Cynthia Carroll became the chief executive of one of the 
world’s top five mining multinationals, Anglo American, which operates a 
portfolio of global mines. Many of the issues that beset Morphet also enveloped 
Carroll. Chief executives of either gender are bound by the logic of a capitalist 
system that operates according to its relentless profitmaking goals. On a daily 
basis, every capitalist manager must achieve a return on capital that is at least 
average for the industry or watch their firm perish. Thus, all chief executives 
constantly confront the potential liquidation of their business and career. 
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Carroll and her female peers are no different from their male counterparts 
regarding the life and death struggle that is waged every day.  
In Carroll’s case, in order to streamline the cost structure and boost the 
productivity of Anglo American, she forced 26 000 compulsory redundancies 
but still failed to reach the profit levels deemed necessary by shareholders.73 By 
2012, cost blowouts on new projects and missed opportunities led to a loss of a 
third of Anglo’s value and a plummeting share price.74 One of Anglo’s largest 
shareholders lost patience and ‘criticised Carroll’s ‘poor decision making’ 
calling for her ‘swift replacement’.75 The economic stakeholders of a 
corporation trump administrative figures such as Carroll and ‘after months of 
intense pressure from shareholders’ she stepped down in October 2012.76 Some 
of her defining problems were replicated by Marissa Mayer.  
C The Case of Marissa Mayer, Yahoo! 
In 2012 the technology giant Yahoo! installed Marissa Mayer as its CEO. As 
the experience of Morphet and Carroll illuminates, capitalism is intrinsically 
volatile. By 2012, Yahoo! was in decline and needed to be revitalised as Google 
and Facebook were taking market share and advertising dollars from Yahoo!77 
To reverse the decline, Mayer issued a decree banning employees from working 
at home and asserted that ‘working side by side’ at company headquarters 
would increase the quality of decisions and insights.78 Analysts took a more 
realistic view and declared that the back-to-work edict was a ploy to cull staff 
by dismissing anyone unwilling to return to a disciplinary regime bent on 
increasing the productivity and competitiveness of Yahoo!79 Mayer remained 
silent in the face of criticism that she was ‘dissing working moms’ by ordering 
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them back to the office.80 Part of her silence is explicable by the fact that Mayer 
had a nursery next to the executive suite to house her infant child.81 She had 
also built an estimated fortune of $300 million.82 
Moral homilies about Mayer’s behaviour must not distract attention from the 
profit-making institutional forces that shaped her conduct. The objective and 
coercive institutions and social structures that dictated the pattern of Morphet, 
Carroll and Mayer’s actions need illuminating. The way the social relations of 
business enmesh its agents and force them to execute its will must colour our 
judgment of those at the commanding heights of the economy. As Roberts 
notes, when the manager of a large firm confronts the decision to sack workers 
in order to restore profitability and stave off eventual liquidation, the 
‘compulsion of a ruthless systemic logic’ transcends any personal misgivings.83 
The female head of a large enterprise can avoid slashing the workforce by 
resigning, but this would kill a corporate career for no discernible benefit as she 
would correctly surmise that, if she faltered, somebody else would be 
compelled to wield the knife.84  
The inner logic of a market economy compels entrepreneurs of whatever gender 
to focus on maximising profits. This line of argument is endorsed by both left 
and right wing thinkers. The law-and-economics school, guided by the axioms 
of neo-classical economics, avers that efficiency considerations dictate that the 
control of the modern corporation must be exclusively allocated to shareholders 
because, otherwise, ‘people who did not receive the marginal gains would be 
influencing corporate discretion, and the influence would not maximize the 
wealth of the participants as a group’.85 Individuals acting on the basis of 
optimising their marginal productivity and self-interest chime with the market-
based compulsion to maximise profits. To the end of maximising profits, the 
need is to appoint people who have a high skill set and ‘regard dissent as a duty 
and that have a good fight now and then’.86 The boxing analogy is apposite for 
the capital investment required by modern corporations for large scale projects 
and the risk associated with failure requires people with a strong nerve, and the 
                                                 
80 Kumar, above n 77. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Marcus Roberts, Analytical Marxism: A Critique (Verso, 1996) 25. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Frank H Easterbrook and Daniel R Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Harvard University Press, 1991) 69. 
86 Kent Greenfield, ‘The Progressive Possibility of Corporate Law’ (2013) 28(3) Australian 
Journal of Corporate Law 14. 
338 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 20 NO 2 
capacity to argue cogently their preferred strategic course for meeting earnings 
per share targets, and beating off competitors. 
The above considerations suggest that it is pointless to allow the choice of top 
company managers to be guided by the candidate’s membership of a particular 
gender or group. This is endorsed by Sally Wheeler, a prominent UK corporate 
law professor, who has observed that  
an assertion that boards of directors do behave or will behave in a particular 
way unless the pool of potential members is widened is a claim unsupported 
by any robustly gathered empirical evidence. It relies instead on anecdotal 
recollection at best.87  
A further point that needs affirming is that corporate law acts as an adjunct to 
the profit motive by imposing a legal duty on directors to serve shareholders’ 
interests. Lord Wedderburn notes that when company law speaks of directors 
serving the ‘interests of the company’ this means ‘the interests of profit’.88 As 
the arch conservative Richard Posner has cogently put it: ‘a profession’s 
characteristic modes of thought might have economic causes’.89 What Posner 
is alluding to is the intimate connection between law and economics and how 
the latter can influence legal concepts. The fundamental mandate of the 
corporation is as Bakan has succinctly put it to make money and eschew ‘ethical 
and social concerns’.90  
There is a studied silence from those promoting the cause of female 
empowerment at board level on the issue of law piloting directors to be 
concerned only for their shareholders and ‘not the community, or the workforce 
or whatever’.91 In the contemporary world, as Berle and Means noted, 
shareholders have largely left the management of their capital to professional 
managers and directors.92 This group now administers large scale corporations. 
However, Pahl and Winkler’s empirical study of corporate directors’ highlights 
that this group is even more intent on constantly improving business 
profitability than the owners of capital who ceded administrative control over 
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big business to a managerial elite.93 In effect, every director is trapped in a 
Faustian bargain with the imperatives of capital no matter what their gender.  
The goal of corporate law is the protection of property rights. Female directors 
and male directors are equally bound by the same legal rules that facilitate 
private profit. Every director, regardless of gender, pursues the aim of ensuring 
that the profit of an enterprise is channelled to shareholders. This axiom was 
cogently expressed by Bowen LJ in Hutton v West Cork Railway Co, stating 
that: 
The law does not say there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no 
cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the 
company…charity has no business to sit at Boards of directors qua charity. 
There is, however, a kind of charitable dealing which is for the interest of 
those who practice it, and to that extent…charity may sit at the Board, but for 
no other purpose.94  
Bowen LJ was not seeking to preclude the company board from engaging in 
philanthropic gestures towards workers or anybody else, but any benefit had to 
also serve the shareholders. The company existed to provide profits for 
shareholders and any sum expended on workers that was not linked to this 
imperative breached directors’ duties. Since 1980 the UK Companies Act has 
had a section stating a director must take account of the interests of employees. 
Corporate law scholars such as Parkinson and Sealy are scathing of the section, 
and its lack of substantive content, and thus window dressing nature.95 Over the 
years the section has been watered down to the point where Davies avers that 
employees have ‘found it difficult to use the section offensively’.96 The British 
academic, Lord Wedderburn, observed that directors’ fiduciary duties were 
formulated to ensure that there was an analogy between the ‘interests of the 
company’ and the guaranteeing of profits to shareholders.97 Statute law in 
Australia is designed to supplement a profit-maximising society. Corcoran 
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notes that the Australian Corporations Law ‘actively discourages corporate 
concern for social welfare when social welfare must be purchased at a cost to 
profit maximisation’.98 The view that the modern corporation is a vehicle for 
maximising the profits of its shareholders was emphasised in 1970 by Milton 
Friedman, a famous liberal thinker and Nobel Prize winning economist. 
Friedman declared that  
in a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an 
employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his 
employers. That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with 
their desires which generally will be to make as much money as possible.99  
For Friedman, corporate executives were acting for the social good when they 
were ‘making maximum profits for stockholders’.100 The only responsibility of 
corporate leaders, declared Friedman, was ‘to make as much money for their 
stockholders as possible’.101 With the law and market systematically operating 
to deny the corporate boardroom the capacity to cultivate civic or ethical 
concerns, it is unsurprising that both female and male directors are, as directors, 
constrained from pursuing goals that fail to meet a commercial standard. The 
law compels the upper strata of corporations of whatever gender to surrender 
to the logic of the market and its legal rules. Boosting the effectiveness of 
mechanisms that may lift the percentage of women directors provides only a 
partial insight into the machinations of the corporate entity.  
An exploration of the logic of the modern corporation reveals that the purpose 
of capitalist production is profit for those who own the instruments of 
production. The individuals who manage and organise work must facilitate 
market imperatives and eschew any move to genuine equity. The objective 
place of individuals in a network of ownership relationships not only 
categorises their status, but is the key to how a hegemonic system of power 
works. The individual behaviour of shareholders and the directors who 
administer capital is shaped by ‘external coercive laws’.102 The search for 
maximum profit is not a function of the personal idiosyncrasy of those owning 
and managing capital. Fundamentally, the quest for maximum profit is driven 
by the competitive individualism of the market. The competition for sales 
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compels each producer to market a product of equal quality at less cost.103 The 
competition for sales compels every business to minimise costs and maximise 
profit.104  
Notable thinkers such as Keynes, Ricardo, Smith and numerous other 
economists, understood the quest for profit to be the guiding principle of a 
market economy.105 Competitive advantage is only obtained by those who 
plough profits back into the company in order to expand faster than their 
competitors.106 The economic logic of the market holds sway regardless of an 
individual’s gender. Every move by Morphet, Carroll and Mayer is only 
explicable when viewed through the conceptual lens of a competition for 
economic survival. To lose in the competitive battle is to ensure the eventual 
downfall of a business. 
The trio of entrepreneurs represented by Morphet, Carroll and Mayer were, first 
and foremost, bearers and executors of economic laws, ready to sacrifice 
anything to stay in the game and be ahead of the competition. Their gender was 
irrelevant and played no role in how they developed their strategic plans. 
Ultimately, for directors to secure their positions, productivity rates have to rise 
and workers’ wages increase at levels well below the increase in productivity 
or, better still, remain stagnant or decline in real terms.107 If successful, this 
policy is translated into higher profit rates. Morphet, Carroll and Mayer 
understood this and operated on this imperative. When Anglo American 
appointed Matt Chambers as Carroll’s successor, his mantra to the market was 
that he was going to turbo-charge productivity rates.108 Carroll fell not because 
she was a woman, but because she was not driving up output per hour and lifting 
earnings per share. This also applied to Morphet. Mayer will be judged by the 
same efficiency and profitability yardstick and, if she fails to meet targets, she 
will be toppled. In April 2015, Mayer was on the cusp of losing her position. 
The share price and growth figures were languishing and unless there was a 
turnaround, it was being mooted that she would be forced to vacate her CEO 
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role at Yahoo!109 In September 2015, with the share price having fallen by a 
quarter in the past year Mayer was clinging on but was in deep trouble, and 
concern about whether Yahoo! would survive was being voiced.110 The lessons 
of corporate history are clear. The social structure of power wins every time 
against gender in corporate boardrooms and on the Stock Exchange. 
IV CONCLUSION  
This article has interrogated the view that regulatory mechanisms need to be 
more efficacious if gender diversity at the apex of the corporate form is to be 
optimised. The pluralist interpretation of how the inadequate representation of 
women on corporate boards could be addressed has been critiqued. This article 
has developed a different conceptual framework that has focused on the 
economic mechanisms of corporate capital. The article has gone beyond seeing 
more women on boards as a way forward to a more democratic society. In sum, 
this article has averred that the compulsive forces of capital accumulation in an 
environment of competitive individualism rule the corporation regardless of the 
gender composition of those at the commanding heights of the economy. It has 
pinpointed how both right and left wing economists are united in perceiving the 
modern corporation as a vehicle driven by the imperative to maximise profit. 
The pursuit of unlimited growth and profit is the motor force of the system. 
This means that little can be achieved by ‘closing the gender gap’ or boosting 
‘social responsibility’. Any slowdown in profitmaking threatens stagnation and 
the breakdown of the capitalist system.111 Every director, regardless of gender, 
must optimise capital accumulation and profit or face the liquidation of their 
company. Every director must constantly strive to lift productivity through 
technological advances and changes to the internal organisation of the business 
in order to cut costs and accrue higher profits than competitors. Lifting the 
participation of women on boards is a worthy cause but it is an objective that 
can mask the fact that a female director is fundamentally defined as a capitalist 
entrepreneur, and in this role is obliged to ensure the profitability of the 
company in order to continue in her prized position.  
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Women company directors are part of the dominant class and far removed from 
the lives of the bulk of female employees. Putting more women in the 
boardroom is a liberal feminist cause that must be supported. Apart from 
anything else, when there are more women in the boardroom and the inner logic 
of the capitalist system remains unchanged, it sends a political message to the 
female workers left behind on the shopfloor that they cannot look for salvation 
from bourgeois women, and they must develop their own emancipatory 
ideology. They will see that raising female board numbers will not in itself 
facilitate rising profits, but even if this were the case, the real winner would be 
capitalist shareholders and the higher profits would come at the cost of added 
sweat from other working class women. Every director must squeeze the 
maximum labour from their workforce and be like a ‘vampire that will not let 
go while there remains a single muscle, sinew or drop of blood to be 
exploited’.112 Capital is indifferent to the gender of the vampire that sucks the 
blood of employees. All it cares about is recruiting those who can deliver super-
profits and thus stay ahead in the competitive game. The watchword of the 
capitalist system is, as Marx noted: ‘Accumulate, accumulate! That is the 
Moses and the prophets!’113 Social justice demands that every progressive 
thinker support the campaign to increase female participation at the apex of the 
corporation whilst recognising that this will not result in the corporate leopard 
changing its spots. 
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